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Abstract
We study how heterogeneous beliefs affect returns and examine whether they are a priced factor in
traditional asset pricing models. To accomplish this task, we suggest new empirical measures based
on the disagreement among analysts about expected earnings (short-term and long-term) and show
they are good proxies. We first establish that the heterogeneity of beliefs matters for asset pricing
and then turn our attention to estimating a structural model in which we use the forecasts of financial
analysts to proxy for agents’ beliefs. Finally, we investigate if the amount of heterogeneity in analysts’
forecasts can help explain asset pricing puzzles.
Economic agents differ in their beliefs, preferences, and endowments. Despite these differences
and despite strong and persuasive arguments put forward for including heterogeneity in finance and
macroeconomics, the representative agent paradigm is still the leading structural approach to asset
pricing.1 This has happened for many reasons. First, in many contexts it is difficult to derive testable
predictions in asset pricing models with heterogeneous agents, though many researchers have made
progress; for example see Duffie and Constantinides (1996), Heaton and Lucas (1995), and Shefrin
(2001). Second, there is a lack of tangible data that reflect heterogeneity. Most of the data avail-
able on the consumption, endowments and beliefs of individual agents is sparse and of questionable
quality. Third, many of the most tractable formulations of heterogeneous agent models are observa-
tionally equivalent to representative agent models. For example when preferences Gorman aggregate
(Gorman 1953) there is often no need to explicitly consider heterogeneous agents because there exists
a representative agent, with a utility function of the same form as the agents, which can be used for
asset pricing (see the early work of Wilson (1968) and Rubinstein (1974)).
In this paper we focus on the heterogeneity of beliefs and for simplicity let agents have the same
preferences. The heterogeneity of beliefs captures how individual agents interpret or have access to
differing information sets. Models with agents who have heterogeneous beliefs have been previously
studied by Abel (1989), Basak (2000), Detemple and Murthy (1994), Li (1999), Shefrin (2001), She-
frin and Statman (1994), Williams (1977), and Zapatero (1998). One of our main innovations is to use
the publicly stated forecasts of financial analysts to proxy for the beliefs of agents in an asset pricing
model with optimizing agents. Financial analysts may not be a random sample from the general pop-
ulation so we discuss various specifications, some of which drive a wedge between the expectations
of agents and the predictions of analysts. In our model there is a representative agent whose beliefs
are the composite of the beliefs of individual agents. Despite the existence of a representative agent,
there is useful information in the beliefs of individual agents. This paper (1) develops an empirically
testable theoretical prediction that expected returns are impacted by heterogeneous beliefs; (2) uses a
factor structure to demonstrate empirically that heterogeneity explains a portion of expected returns
and volatility; and (3) estimates a consumption-based model that incorporates dispersion and biases
in analysts’ forecasts. In work that was undertaken and completed at about the same time as earlier
drafts of this paper, Shefrin (2001) studies closely related issues. Shefrin’s approach is slightly more
general, as we make specific assumptions for the empirical implementation of the model.
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Before estimating our structural model we take a reduced form approach and examine first whether
the heterogeneity of beliefs is a priced factor in traditional asset pricing models. We suggest new em-
pirical measures of heterogeneity. Unlike factors for size, book-to-market, and momentum that have
emerged due to evidence of empirical regularities, our hypothesis that dispersion is priced emerges
from a theoretical model. We show factors constructed from the disagreement among analysts about
expected (short-term and long-term) earnings have explanatory power in asset pricing models. Next
we focus on return volatility. Since one might expect the same factors that predict returns also predict
future volatility, we examine whether disagreement among analysts explains return volatility. Im-
plementing methodology similar to Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok (1999), we find simple models,
particularly those that include only the dispersion factors, produce lower forecast errors and have
better sample properties than complex multi-factor models.
While the explicit analysis of heterogeneity of beliefs is only timidly present in traditional asset
pricing models, it is most often omnipresent in behavioral finance models.2 The latter class of models
emphasizes the psychology of individuals and its relevance for financial markets, particularly in the
pricing of assets. The analysis in this paper relates to the behavioral finance literature in several ways.
The use of analyst forecasts prompts the question about biases in their predictions and recommenda-
tions (see Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2002) for a comprehensive overview of analyst biases). We
estimate parameters which reflect the extent to which agents have the beliefs of financial analysts.
More importantly, both psychological and purely rational theories of asset pricing generally imply
that returns are predictable. However, most often behavioral finance models are not formulated ex-
plicitly in the context of pricing kernel models. One notable exception is Shefrin (2001) who analyzes
the manner in which traders’ errors (called sentiments) affect the pricing kernel. In this paper, we es-
timate pricing kernels for models with heterogeneous agents whose beliefs are connected to those of
analysts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we discuss fundamental pricing
equations in heterogeneous agent economies. Section 2 discusses the limited form of rationality
that agents in our models have and shows that dispersion is priced. Section 3 describes the data
used in this paper and how the beliefs of individuals are measured. Section 4 examines the role of
heterogeneity of beliefs, particularly dispersion of analyst forecasts, as a priced factor in traditional
asset pricing models. This section also describes the contribution of the dispersion factor above
fundamental factors to predict out-of-sample returns and volatility. Section 5 introduces the behavioral
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elements of amplification and bias into our model. Section 6 investigates if analyst forecasts can help
explain asset pricing puzzles. Section 7 concludes.
1 Beliefs and the pricing kernel
There are a variety of ways to formulate models with agents who have heterogeneous beliefs. For
example, see Detemple and Murthy (1994), Zapatero (1998), Basak (2000) and Shefrin (2001), among
others. In this section we describe a complete markets model in which agents have heterogeneous
beliefs and identical power reward functions. The first subsection describes the pricing kernel, while
the second subsection specifies how the distribution of beliefs is determined from data on beliefs about
conditional means. The third subsection describes how we approximate consumption forecasts. We
conclude by showing how the return on an asset can be decomposed into a fundamental component
that depends only on the true probabilities and a component which depends on the actual beliefs of
agents.3
1.1 The pricing kernel
Consider a complete markets heterogeneous agent economy in which agents have different beliefs
about the world. We assume the beliefs of any agent are absolutely continuous with respect to the
true probabilities and vice versa. For now, we make no other assumptions about what agents believe
or how their beliefs evolve. Agents may be Bayesians who optimally update their beliefs or they may
have degenerate priors and refuse to take into account new information.
Assume there areI types of agents who have power reward functions and live an infinite number






1 − γ (1)
whereβ is a time discount factor,Eit is the expectation with respect to information available at time
t, cit is time t consumption, andγ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk-aversion. Whenγ = 1
we interpret the agents’ reward functions as logarithmic. We allow agents in each period to either
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consume or invest in one ofn different assets. We assume there are enough assets to make markets
complete. Let the gross real return, including dividends, from holding assetp b tween periodst and
t + 1 be rpt+1. For a risk-free asset this return is observed at timet. For a risky asset the return is








where at timet, the amount invested in assetp is ϕipt and labor income iswit. An agent’s problem
is to maximize lifetime utility, equation (1), subject to the sequence of budget constraints given by
equation (2) for each datet. A constraint to rule out Ponzi schemes is also imposed. The agents
choose consumption and the amount to invest in each asset at each date adapted to information that is
known. At timet agents know the value of variables datedand earlier. They also know the return on
risk-free assets from timet to t + 1. It is straightforward to show that if the timet price of an asset is











This is the fundamental equation for consumption-based asset pricing and it is one way to write the
Euler equation for a typei agent’s optimization problem.4 This equation holds for any asset using the
beliefs and consumption of any agent.
Let λit be the timet Pareto weight for agents of typei (a formal definition of Pareto weights
appears in Appendix A). The Pareto weight measures the importance of typei agents and is related
to their wealth. The Pareto weights are constructed so that they sum to one at every date. We will
assume that a function of the Pareto weights are constant over time:






is constant over time.
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This assumption holds exactly if the economy has reached an invariant distribution across agents and
always holds exactly whenγ = 1, even if an invariant distribution has not been reached. Note that
the Pareto weight of any individual agent can evolve over time; however, the population distribution,
as measured by equation (4), is assumed time invariant. In data, Assumption 1 may not be exactly
satisfied. (Indeed it is not exactly satisfied by the data we use to measure the Pareto weights in
subsequent sections.) Nevertheless, Assumption 1 is a plausible simplifying approximation over short
time intervals when (1)γ is close to one, (2) the economy is near an invariant distribution, and (3) the
beliefs of agents are not too disparate. See Blume and Easley (1992) for examples of economies for
which it would be unreasonable to assume a constant distribution. It is possible to do the theoretical
analysis in this section without imposing Assumption 1. Shefrin (2001) takes this approach. Since we
do not have reliable data on the short term movements of the Pareto weights it is convenient for our
empirical analysis to impose Assumption 1.















Equations similar to (5) have been studied by Detemple and Murthy (1994), Basak (2000) and Shefrin
(2001) and tells us that security prices are a weighted average, across agents, of the security prices
that would obtain when all agents are identical. Equation (5) is in terms of aggregate consumption
whereas equation (3) is in terms of the consumption of a single agent. Equation (5) allows us to
state the pricing equation in terms of fundamentals– aggregate consumption and asset returns– and
the variables pertaining to individual agents which are embedded inλit andEit.
1.2 The distribution of an individual’s beliefs
In this paper we empirically estimate equation (5) using the forecasts of analysts as proxies for beliefs
of agents. For many of the variables, including asset returns, we face the following situation. We have
an historical record of actual values and we have implied forecasts of conditional expectations. To
estimate equation (5) we need more than this: we need the entire distribution of each agent’s beliefs.
In this section we explain a method for approximating the entire distribution by tying the higher order
moments of agents’ beliefs to the true distribution.5
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To make things concrete, letx be a vector of positive variables for which we have a time series
record of observations. At timet, the actual value ofx is denotedxt. Assume we also have a time
series record of conditional expectations of several different agents of the one period ahead value of
x : µxit+1|t = Eitxt+1. We have no other direct information about the individual agent’s perception
of the distribution ofx. Since our empirical work requires more information about the individuals’
perceived distribution ofx we need to make an assumption about the distribution of an individual’s
beliefs, namely:6
Assumption 2 (Homotopy) Letxt+1 be generated by the conditional cdfξxt (xt+1) andµxt+1|t be the
true conditional mean ofxt+1 given timet information. Let the conditional expectation of agenti be
µxit+1|t = Eitxt+1. Then the conditional cdf ofxt+1 given timet information from the point of view of
agenti is
ξixt (xt+1) = ξxt
(
xt+1 ∗ µxt+1|t / µxit+1|t
)
.
Here the notation “*” denotes element by element multiplication and “/” denotes element by element
division.
The assumption completely specifies the distribution of individual beliefs in terms of the known condi-
tional mean held by an agent, the unknown true conditional mean, and the unknown true distribution.
This assumption entails that if agenti has a more optimistic view of the conditional mean than agent
j then agenti is globally more optimistic than agentj in the sense that ifµxit+1|t ≥ µxjt+1|t then
for any xt+1 it is the case thatξixt (xt+1) ≤ ξjxt (xt+1) . Similar to Assumption 1, it is possible to
do the theoretical analysis in this section without imposing Assumption 2. Shefrin (2001) takes this
approach. Since we do not have data on the distribution of an individual’s beliefs it is convenient for
our empirical analysis to impose Assumption 2.7
This specification has a number of appealing additional properties. Under this specification if
an agent has the correct beliefs about the conditional mean then he has the correct beliefs about the
entire distribution. That is ifµxit+1|t = µxt+1|t thenξixt (xt+1) = ξxt (xt+1) and from the Homotopy
Assumption 2 agenti knows the complete distribution ofxt+1. This specification easily allows us to
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transform integrals againstξixt (xt+1) into integrals againstξxt (xt+1) . We have for any functionf,
when the integrals below exist,
∫











yt+1 ∗ µxit+1|t / µxt+1|t
)
dξxt (yt+1) . (7)
From this it follows thatµxit+1|t really is the mean ofi’s beliefs since∫
xt+1 dξixt (xt+1) =
(
µxit+1|t / µxt+1|t
) ∗ ∫ yt+1 dξxt (yt+1) = µxit+1|t.
Appendix B shows this specification has the appealing property that all agents correctly know the
second and higher order conditional central moments oflog(x).
1.3 Beliefs about consumption growth
Our data does not provide direct measurements on analysts’ perceived conditional means of consump-
tion growth whereas our empirical work requires such information. We construct an approximation,
µgit+1|t, to typei agents’ mean forecast of the gross rate of aggregate consumption growth by tying
the forecast to the forecasted market return. We state the approximation as an assumption.
Assumption 3 Agenti’s belief about the conditional mean of aggregate consumption growth,µgit+1|t,
satisfies
log µgit+1|t = qt + φ log µmit+1|t (8)
whereφ is a constant,qt is an unknown function of current information andµmit+1|t is agenti’s
forecast of the market return.
We take the time-invariant constantφ and the time-varying functionqt to be the same for all agents.
Note thatµgit+1|t is agenti’s forecast ofaggregateconsumption growth which is not necessarily equal
to agenti’s forecast of his own consumption growth.
In our empirical work we consider different values ofφ. It is interesting to note thatφ should be
equal to one in a general equilibrium model in which all agents have logarithmic reward functions
and the same beliefs.
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1.4 A decomposition
In this section we decompose expected returns into a fundamental component and a heterogeneity









































is the heterogeneity component of the pricing equation for assetp. Notice thathpt varies across as-
sets. Equation (10) follows from equation (9) and the result in equation (6) applied to conditional
expectations. Equation (11) follows because the conditional mean forecasts are known at timet.
A simple conditional decomposition follows from rearranging terms in equation (11) using the
identity thatEtxy = EtxEty + covt(x, y). The expected return of assetp is therefore













= Fundamental component + Heterogeneity component







to be the risk-free rate if agentsagreedon their forecasts ofg for all assets. The actual risk-free rate,






Even though all agents agree on forecasts of a risk-free return there are pricing implications if agents
disagree on forecasts of consumption growth.
This decomposition illustrates the effect of heterogeneity of beliefs on expected returns. When
there is no disagreement, at all dates,hpt = 1 for all t and the heterogeneity component in the
decomposition is zero. When there is heterogeneityhpt need not equal to one and there can be pricing
implications. The fundamental component of the return is not altered as heterogeneity is increased.8
We will revisit the decomposition of returns in Section 5.3.
We have derived the decomposition under Assumptions 1 and 2. It is possible to derive an anal-
ogous decomposition without requiring both assumptions. Shefrin (2001) takes this more general
approach.
2 Limited rational expectations and dispersion
For now, we assume agents have exactly the same beliefs as analysts. So, if there areI an lysts
we assume there areI types of agents and agents of typei (for i=1,. . . I) have thesame beliefs as
analysti.9 The data used in this paper provides us with measures of conditional mean forecasts of
stock returns.10 We construct a conditional mean forecast for consumption growth as described at the
end of Section 1.2. We do not have direct observations on thetrueconditional means of consumption
growth and stock returns. To apply the Homotopy Assumption 2 we need to take a stand on these
true conditional means. We propose a limited form of rational expectations in which the economy as
a whole is correct on average about its expectations of consumption growth and stock returns. In this









The Pareto weights are used to measure the importance of agents. This assumption is motivated from
a desire to include the actual beliefs of agents in asset pricing models while making as few departures
as possible from rational expectation models. As we explain at the end of this section, the economy
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as a whole will not have rational expectations about all variables in the economy and our model will
include some features prevalent in the behavioral finance literature.
Recall that equations (5) and (11) tell us security prices are a weighted average, across agents, of
the security prices that would obtain when all agents are identical. The dispersion of beliefs about
g−γt+1rpt+1 doesn’t matter. Only the mean matters. However, the dispersion of beliefs aboutgt+1 and
rpt+1 can matter. To see this, interpret the Pareto weights as probabilities andÊt and ĉovt as the
expectation and covariance operators over these fictitious probabilities (so for exampleÊtµpit+1|t =∑I




































where the second line follows from equation (16). If the co-dispersion in the last term increases then
hpt will increase if the first term remains constant. So, if the mean ofµ
−γ
gjt+1|t andµpjt+1|t remain
constanthpt can still increase. Likewise, depending upon the value ofγ, it is possible that if the mean





can increase as dispersion in consumption growth
increases.12
One could object to our formulation because if we assumed agents are correct on average about
the conditional mean ofg−γt+1rpt+1 then dispersion would not matter. Furthermore given we assumed in
equations (15) and (16) agents are correct on average about the conditional means of asset returns and
consumption growth it might seem natural to assume they also are correct about the conditional mean
of g−γt+1rpt+1. However this objection is not valid. If we assume agents are correct on average in their
expectations of asset returns and consumption growth, then, in general, under Assumption 2, agents
cannot have the correct expectations aboutg−γt+1rpt+1, when theydisagreeabout the expectations of
asset returns and consumption growth. This is what equation (18) tells us.
Hence in our model, the economy as a whole, has a limited form of rational expectations. It has
rational expectations about simple variables like asset returns and consumption growth but possibly
irrational expectations about more complicated variables likeg−γt+1rpt+1. This feature is also present
in a number of behavioral finance models including the early work of Simon (1955) and Tversky
and Kahneman (1974). Using this work, Hirshleifer (2001) argues that biases can be viewed as
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outgrowths of heuristic simplification. One can indeed argue, as in equations (15) and (16), that
agents are correct on average about the conditional means of asset returns and consumption, but
may not be able to capture properly expectations of complex processes such as those that enter the
stochastic discount factor. In reality agents’ expectations of asset returns and consumption growth are
probably not correct on average. If we allowed for this then including heterogeneous beliefs about
asset returns and consumption growth would have two effects. One effect comes from the dispersion
of beliefs and another effect comes from errors in the conditional mean of beliefs about asset returns
and consumption growth. In this section we zero out the second effect and focus only on the dispersion
effect. In Section 5 we allow agents (but not analysts) to have biased expectations of stock returns.
3 Measuring beliefs
Thus far, we studied the theoretical properties of models with heterogeneous beliefs; however, our
ultimate goal is to empirically investigate the role played by the heterogeneity of beliefs. We follow
two different empirical strategies. We first examine whether the heterogeneity of beliefs is a priced
factor in traditional asset pricing models. This is a reduced form approach and requires the construc-
tion of factors that reflect heterogeneous beliefs. The second empirical strategy consists of estimating
structural equations, based on the models presented in the previous sections, while being careful about
measuring agents’ actual beliefs.
In this section we describe the data used for the various empirical exercises. Both empirical
approaches require different data collections and constructions. We construct a factor specification
for short-term earnings and long-term earnings growth forecasts (measured as the standard deviation
of month-end forecasts) and examine the relevance of these factors in standard asset pricing models.
Similarly, based on analyst earnings predictions we construct expected returns which are necessary to
estimate fundamental pricing equations.
3.1 Constructing heterogeneity factors
We begin by acquiring Fama-French factors for a sample period that coincides with the heterogeneity
factor. Monthly firm returns (denotedr for a generic firm), prices, and shares outstanding are collected
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from the CRSP monthly tapes. Data to compute book value of equity is collected from the annual
Compustat tapes. We also obtain the risk-free interest rate( b), monthly estimates of size, book-
to-market, and momentum factors (SMB, HML, and UMD, respectively) as well as market returns
(rm).
13 Tables 1 and 2 provide summary statistics for returns and explanatory variables. The aver-
age monthly firm and market excess returns of 1.23% and 1.16% are substantially larger than those
computed by Fama and French (1993) of 0.67% and 0.43%, respectively.14 These results are not sur-
prising given the time period of analysis (1991-1997) primarily occurred during up markets (market
returns were positive in 61 out of 84 months). The average monthly size factor (SMB) is 0.14%, the
book-to-market factor (HML) averages 0.47%, and the momentum factor (UMD) is 0.78% per month.
These results are similar to those found in other research that use substantially longer time series.
We want to construct factors that pertain to heterogeneity in the same fashion. For the remainder
of this subsection, we discuss our methodology.
3.1.1 Why analyst dispersion?
We investigate whether the heterogeneity of beliefs is a priced factor in traditional asset pricing mod-
els. We argue that factors constructed from the disagreement among analysts about expected (short-
term and long-term) earnings are good proxies for quantifying heterogeneous beliefs. Other proxies
have been proposed. For example, as support for Harris and Raviv (1993) and Shalen (1993), Gra-
ham and Harvey (1996) find dispersion among newsletter “forecasts” is positively related to histor-
ical volatility, implied (or expected) volatility and volume. Alternatively, Bessembinder, Chan, and
Seguin (1996) examine the open interest on the S&P 500 Index futures as a measure of disagreement
in opinion and link it to trading volume. Disagreement among analysts is a more appealing source
to extract heterogeneity. Unlike other measures, such as short-sale constraints, breadth of ownership,
open interest and newsletter forecasts, dispersion measures are easily available for a large number of
equities.
Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) examine short-term earnings forecast dispersion in predict-
ing future stock returns and relate their findings to the short sale constraint literature, where increased
disagreement among investors leads to lower future returns. Unlike their work, we explicitly construct
a factor specification for short-term and long-term forecast dispersion, which allows us to measure
the incremental contribution of dispersion in factor asset pricing models, and sets the stage for out-
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of-sample predictive properties of these factors, which is detailed in Section 4. Before providing the
details, we note that the idea to use the dispersion among analyst forecasts as a measure of hetero-
geneous beliefs is found in a number of papers. For instance, it has been shown contemporaneous
dispersion of analysts’ short-term forecasts is significantly and positively related to volatility [see, for
example, Ajinkya and Gift (1985), L’Her and Suret (1996), and Lobo and Tung (1998)].
Our analysis extends the existing literature of the role of analyst dispersion on returns by dis-
tinguishing fundamental factor contributions from factors for the heterogeneity of beliefs and by
explicitly testing a decomposition of asset pricing returns and volatility that ties into theoretical
models. Moreover, we focus more explicitly on return and volatility dynamics by examining out-
of-sample performance. This safeguards us from data mining issues, as we construct a pricing factor
that captures the heterogeneity of beliefs and test its predictive ability for out-of-sample returns and
volatility.15
While dispersion of analyst forecasts is a reasonable measure of heterogeneous beliefs, there are
several issues, including biases and timing issues that should be addressed. There is an extensive liter-
ature that examines the value of analysts’ earnings forecasts (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh 2002), and
substantial evidence exists that analysts are biased in their forecasts. Analysts are generally optimistic
about annual and longer-term forecasts (Brown 2001, Capstaff, Paudyal, and Rees 1998, De Bondt
and Thaler 1985, De Bondt and Thaler 1987, De Bondt and Thaler 1990, Dechow and Sloan 1997,
LaPorta 1996), but there is some evidence that as the forecast period declines, analysts become slightly
pessimistic in their forecasts (Brown 2001, Matsumoto 2002, O’Brien 1988). Moreover, analysts tend
to overreact to positive news and underreact to negative news (Easterwood and Nutt 1999). There are
many reasons for this persistent bias, including agency issues (Michaely and Womack 1999, Rajan
and Servaes 1997) and behavioral biases (Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny 1998, Daniel, Hirshleifer,
and Subrahmanyam 1998). It also appears that investors do not fully correct for biases.16 While
we do not dispute this evidence, we should note that our analysis is based on portfolios rather than
individual stocks, an issue we will revisit in Section 6.
Whatever the verdict about biases, we focus ondispersionamong analysts. In the event forecasts
are biased, we take the dispersion or deviation from the consensus forecast.17 Stocks with little
disagreement, though perhaps biased in the mean, are treated differently from stocks where analysts
have widely different views. However, focusing on dispersion is not entirely immune to bias issues.
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For example, Lin and McNichols (1998) argue that analysts are more likely to discontinue coverage
of firms about which they have unfavorable opinions. Therefore, analysts that predict extremely
negative earnings forecasts may disappear from the sample, which may reduce the “true” dispersion
of analysts’ beliefs. Moreover, analysts are also under no obligation to update forecasts, even as new
information arrives. The potential problem of staleness in forecasts and dispersion arises. However,
we cannot determine from our data whether analysts insufficiently update their forecasts or if the
forecasts are not updated because the beliefs of the analysts remain unchanged. We err on the side
that analysts do not update because their beliefs remain unchanged and use all available forecasts in
the construction of dispersion.18
A final note regarding sample selection is in order. Prior studies that examine the empirical im-
plications of fundamental factors on returns and volatility have primarily analyzed relatively long
time horizons for estimation and use large cross-sectional samples of firms [see, for example, Chan,
Karceski, and Lakonishok (1999), Fama and French (1993), and Griffin (2002)]. However, because
of the constraints on the availability of our measures of dispersion, long time series of data cannot be
constructed. We examine the S&P 500 Index between 1991 and 1997 because many small firms had
little or no analyst coverage in the early First Call data, and adequate analyst coverage is needed to
create meaningful dispersion measures. While the results obtained may be criticized as being sample
specific given the intentional design of the sample and the short time period for analysis, we formu-
late tests similar to those of previous studies [specifically, Section 4.2 of Fama and French (1993)] for
comparison purposes.
3.1.2 Analyst forecasts, dispersion and factor specifications
We produce two measures of heterogeneous beliefs from the First Call/Thomson databases: dispersion
of short-term (one-year ahead) dollar earnings forecasts and dispersion of long-term (five-year ahead)
earnings growth rate forecasts, measured as the standard deviation of forecasts. Only the last available
dispersion measure in each month is used. The average monthly level of short-term (long-term)
forecast dispersion is $0.20 (4.14%), with approximately 15 (19) analysts furnishing short-term (long-
term) forecasts per firm in the S&P 500 Index, which is substantially higher than the average of three
analysts per firm for the entire First Call database.
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Panel B of Table 1 examines the differences in firm characteristics between high and low disper-
sion firms. Similar to Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) and Qu, Starks, and Yan (2003), we find
a negative relation between dispersion and returns. Confirming Crombez (2001) and others, we find
larger firms tend to have less disagreement about earnings expectations, as do growth (low BE/ME)
firms. Interestingly, we find that there is greater institutional participation and a larger number of
analysts for high dispersion firms, which is directly in contrast to Crombez (2001) and the short-sale
restriction literature (Chen, Hong, and Stein 2000), which predicts that as disagreement increases, the
breadth of ownership should decrease.
In Figure 1, we display average levels of dispersion. As noted, analyst optimism tends to decline as
the fiscal year draws to a close. While we do not actually make a comparison to realized earnings, we
find some evidence that forecasts decline throughout the fiscal year for short-term forecasts. However,
we do not find any evidence of seasonal patterns in long-term forecasts.
We also examine the incidence of “switching” from low to high dispersion firms across months.
Panel C of Table 1 displays that for short-term dispersion approximately 30% of firms switch from
high dispersion to low dispersion or vice versa in a given year. (Monthly switching is slightly less.)
Approximately 15% of firms characterized by long-term dispersion switch per year.
In order to be comparable to the market, size, book-to-market, and momentum factors, we con-
struct dispersion factors for both the short-term and long-term forecasts. Dispersion factors include
all 500 firms in the S&P 500 Index, which are updated annually to reflect changes to the index. In
each month, the dispersion, is ranked and the median value is used as the breakpoint to categorize
high and low dispersion forecasts.19 Value-weighted returns are then calculated each month for high
and low dispersion portfolios. A zero investment strategy is realized as we purchase high dispersion
stocks and short low dispersion stocks [see, for example, Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok (1999)
for the construction of mimicking portfolios]. The two factors examined are DISP and LTGDISP for
short-term and long-term forecasts, respectively. Merton (1987) posits that dispersion represents a
compensation to investors for the idiosyncratic risk from holding undiversified portfolios. Since dis-
persion implies higher variation in earnings streams, stocks with high dispersion should earn larger
future returns.20
As reported in Table 2, the average monthly return for the short-term dispersion factor, DISP, is
-0.28%, while the average return for LTGDISP is 0.23% per month. Hence, LTGDISP appears to be
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consistent with the Merton hypothesis that dispersion proxies for idiosyncratic risk, while DISP is
not. The market factor and UMD are highly statistically significant, HML and DISP are marginally
significant at the 10% level; however, the average returns for the SMB and LTGDISP factors are in-
significantly different from zero. Table 2 also provides Pearson correlation coefficients for relations
between the explanatory factors. Unlike Fama and French (1993), we do not observe a significant
relation between the market and the size factors; however, HML is significantly negatively correlated
with both rm − rb and SMB, which is consistent with the findings of Fama and French. Although
positively correlated with both the market factor and HML, DISP is significantly positively corre-
lated at the 1% level only with SMB, indicating that dispersion may be more important for smaller
firms. LTGDISP is positively correlated withrm − rb, SMB and DISP, and negatively correlated with
HML. Both DISP and LTGDISP are significantly negatively correlated with UMD. Returns for both
dispersion factors tend to be higher when small cap stocks outperform large cap stocks; however, we
observe DISP (LTGDISP) returns are higher (lower) when value stocks outperform growth stocks.
Overall, these findings suggest traditional factors may be encapsulating, as anticipated, some of the
same risk measures dispersion factors have captured.
3.2 Construction of expected returns
In order to construct expected return forecasts to be used in the aforementioned structural models,
we collect fiscal short-term earnings estimates, long-term earnings growth forecasts, and investment
recommendations from First Call/Thomson databases. Brokerage houses are not required to follow a
schedule, such as that for macroeconomic forecasts, when updating their investment recommendations
or earnings forecasts. Therefore, there is an unevenness when forecasts occur in a given month. For
example, an analyst may update an earnings forecast for IBM three times during July 1995 and then
will not update again until October 1995. We take two steps to correct for this. First, for each firm,
we select only the last forecast in a given month to be the month-end forecast, regardless of where
it may fall in the month. If there is no forecast within a given month, we carry forward the previous
month’s forecast until the the analyst issues the next new forecast.
Our study focuses on the S&P 500 firms included in the Index between 1991 and 1997 (updated
annually). While the S&P 500 firms are among the largest firms listed in US markets, brokerage
houses are under no obligation to cover any particular firm. Thus, while some of the brokerage houses
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cover at least a subsample of S&P 500 firms between 1991 and 1997, we examine six bulge-bracket
brokers that covered identical monthly subsets of S&P 500 firms between April 1994 and December
1997 (45 monthly observations).21 Unlike the factor composition which includes all 500 firms in the
Index, the number of firms that jointly spans the six brokerage houses in each month ranges from 50
to 83 firms, with the mean (median) number of firms as 68 (66).
Analysts do not forecast future returns per se. Recent work by Brav, Lehavy, and Michaely (2003)
employs analysts’ price target estimates to approximateex anteexpected returns; however, price target
data are unavailable during the time period we examine. Instead, given our data limitations, we rely on
analysts’ earnings forecasts and investment recommendations. In order to extrapolate return forecasts
from analysts, we implement a modified constant dividend growth model.22 While this model relies on
expected future dividends to back out the market capitalization rate (expected future returns), there are
several issues that make this model difficult to use. First, not all firms pay dividends. Second, while
we have today’s dividend in dollars, analysts do not predict future dividends or the expected growth
of those dividends. Third, firms have the option to suspend dividend payments in times of financial
trouble. Thus, while our measure of the forecasted returns is not exactly that intended by the constant
dividend growth model, we believe that it is a fairly accurate approximation since all firms report
earnings and most firms are covered by at least one brokerage firm that provides earnings forecasts.
Thus, we substitute the next fiscal year’s earnings forecast in for the expected future dividend and
substitute the long-term earnings growth forecast for the growth rate of dividends.
Assumption 4 At timet, brokerage housei’s belief about the expected gross return on stockp be-
tween periodst andt + 1 is




where for stockp and brokerage housei : ∆ipt is the one-year ahead fiscal year net income per share
forecast,Qpt is the current-month price, andδipt is the five-year earnings growth forecast.
∆ andδ change when a brokerage house updates its short-term or long-term earnings forecasts; how-
ever, the expected return (or market capitalization rate) is updated at the end of each month. The
beliefs of brokerage housei are the combined beliefs of all analysts at brokerage housei. In our data
set for a given brokerage housei there is at most one analyst who covers each stock.23 In subsequent
sections we often refer to the beliefs of brokerage housei as being the beliefs of a fictitious analyst
that we refer to as analysti.
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Three series of returns are constructed based on short-term dispersion, long-term dispersion, and
historical volatility (based on a 60-month rolling sample of historical standard deviation of price
returns). In each month, the firms are ranked from lowest to highest for each of the three series. For
example, in April 1994, the percentage short-term dispersion (broker-weighted average dispersion
divided by month-end price) is computed for each firm. Rather than equally weighting each brokerage
firm, we rank-weight each brokerage firm in each year according to the ranking of their analysts in the
Institutional Investor.All American Research Team poll in the prior year. The weights are normalized
to sum to 1 in each year. These percentage dispersions are ranked and we separate firms into “high”
or “low” dispersion based on where the firm falls relative to the median of the series.24 Firms are then
size-weighted within each category each month.
We also use these weights to proxy for the Pareto weights of agents.
Assumption 5 The number of types of agents,I, is equal to the number of brokerage houses. The
Pareto weight of agents of typei is determined by the ranking of analysts who work in brokerage
housei.
Throughout this paper we link agents of typei with brokerage housei. Assumption 5 says that bro-
kerage houses with higher quality analysts correspond to agents who have more total wealth.25
4 The dispersion of beliefs as a factor
While the market, size, and book-to-market factors are designed to capture the component of expected
returns and volatility related to fundamental factors, a major focus of this paper is whether a factor
that captures the heterogeneity of investors’ beliefs improves upon either the factor models or the
predictive ability of these models for out-of-sample returns or volatility.
In Section 1.4 we observed that expected returns can be decomposed into two components : one
component determined by traditional factors, the other component dependent on the heterogeneity of
beliefs. The first empirical assessment of heterogeneity will exploit this decomposition. In particular,
consider Hansen and Richard (1987) and subsequent work, and suppose one projects the unobserved
stochastic discount factor onto a set of asset prices. Namely, we replacest+1 in the fundamental
pricing equation by the projectionsft+1 = Proj(st+1|ft), onto a set of “traditional factors”,ft, that can
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be viewed as proxies for marginal utility growth. Besides the “traditional factors”, i.e. the Fama-
French factors, we use a dispersion factor that relates to heterogeneity. We proceed in two steps,
namely first project returns onto the Fama-French factors and then project the pricing error onto the
dispersion factor. This two-step strategy allows the traditional factors to explain as much as possible
the dependence of the stochastic discount factor on heterogeneity.
In this first empirical assessment we do not only limit our attention to excess returns, but also
examine return volatility. One might expect the same factors that explain returns also predict return
volatility. Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok (1999) employ various factor models and compare each
model’s forecasts of future volatility and covariance.26 They find the most simple models, in particu-
lar, the one-factor market model, have smaller forecast errors than more complex multi-factor models
in predicting variances, indicating (1) factors predicting the mean return do not predict volatility and
(2) higher-dimensional models may overfit the data. When we include a factor for dispersion of be-
liefs in our estimates of out-of-sample volatility, the forecast error in volatility models is substantially
reduced, confirming again the theoretical predictions of the decomposition put forward.
Before moving on, it is worth pointing out that our analysis is based on conventional asset pricing
models where no other frictions are present apart from the heterogeneity of beliefs. Thereduc d form
approach taken in this section does not preclude alternative interpretations, many which rely on some
type of market friction.27 For example, since Miller (1977) there have been attempts to resolve the
issue of short sales regulations and divergence of opinions. When there are short sale constraints on
assets, an increase in the divergence of opinions leads to lower subsequent returns. Chen, Hong, and
Stein (2000) use the breadth of ownership as a measure of dispersion and find that decreases in breadth
of ownership (an increase in divergence of opinion) leads to lower subsequent returns. In a separate
line of research, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2000) utilize market microstructure principles and
create a measure of private information. They find investors need to be compensated for the risk of
holding firms with greater information asymmetries between investors as the probability of private
information increases.28 These models suggest neither short sale constraints nor private information
asymmetries can be diversified away and are likely reflected in measures of dispersion of beliefs.
They represent a form of systematic risk; therefore, investors should be compensated for that risk.
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4.1 Construction of factor models, forecasts of returns and volatility
Consider the return process, which we shall denotert, and the linear projection:
rt+1 = E
L
t [rt+1 |ft ] + ηft = a′ft + ηft (19)
whereEL stands for the linear projection and assume the Fama-French set of factors are being used.
As noted before, such a specification can be extended to include other factors as well, namely those
pertaining to heterogeneous beliefs. The main motivation for the empirical work reported in this
section is to find empirical factors,ht, that are related to the residual variation of (19) namely:
ηft = d
′ht + ηt. (20)
In time series regressions of factor models, the slopes andR2s are direct evidence of whether
pricing factors capture common variation in stock returns. More specifically, in the fixed parameter
case with excess returns the intercept provides a measure of the pricing error of each model while the
slope coefficients give the factor loadings of each stocki on each of the factorsrm − rb, SMB, HML,
UMD, DISP, and LTGDISP.
For the purpose of empirical testing we construct 15 factor models that incorporate various combi-
nations of the six factors. Model 1 is a standard one-factor CAPM model that uses the excess return on
the value-weighted market index. Model 2 supplements the excess market return with size and book-
to-market factors (Fama and French 1993). Model 3 represents the Carhart (1997) four-factor model,
namely Fama-French, plus a factor which captures momentum. Models 4 and 5 examine the excess
market return in conjunction with the short-term and long-term dispersion factors, respectively. Mod-
els 6 and 8 combine the three-factor model with short-term and long-term dispersion, while Models 7
and 9 augment Models 6 and 8 with the momentum factor. Models 10 and 11 examine the individual
power of the dispersion factors, while Models 12 and 14 combine the dispersion factors with size
and book-to-market and Models 13 and 15 supplement with momentum. Models 10-15 exclude the
presence of the market factor, which Fama and French show to be significantly related to expected
returns, in order to isolate the impact of the other factors.29 In Section 4.2, we examine the in sample
predictive power of the dispersion factor on excess returns.
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We next create estimations of equity returns and volatility employing the methodology similar
to that used in Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok (1999). Using a rolling sample of return data over
the previous 60 months as our estimation period, we obtain the estimated sensitivities, the mean and
variance of each factor, the covariances between factors, as well as residuals for return estimates
and squared residuals for volatility estimates. The factor model described in Chan, Karceski, and
Lakonishok (1999) is utilized to obtain forecasts of monthly returns and volatility. Monthly out-of-
sample returns and volatility are constructed using a 12-month rolling sample starting in the month
following the factor measurements. Out-of-sample tests are presented in Section 4.3.
4.2 Is dispersion of beliefs a priced factor?
We examine the role of dispersion as a factor in various factor models using individual security returns
as well as portfolio returns based on size and book-to-market ratios (see Fama and French (1993) for
portfolio formation details). Table 3 contains estimates of in-sample time-series regressions for a
value-weighted portfolio of all stocks in the S&P 500 Index, constructed in each of the 84 months
of the sample period. Only the nine factor models which contain the market factor are presented in
Table 3. While the dispersion factors are highly significant in Models 10-15, we do not include these
models in Table 3 due to the very large pricing errors.30 We obtain the intercept (the pricing error
of the model), coefficients for each factor and relevant t-statistics, and adjusted-R2s for each of the
time-series regressions.
Both measures of the dispersion factor are highly statistically significant and the coefficients are
positively related to the S&P 500 Index returns as shown in Table 3. The market factor is the domi-
nant factor, although each of the other factors is generally statistically significant. The size factor is
positively and significantly related to excess returns; however, the magnitude and significance of the
size factor decreases when either of the dispersion factors are included. Moreover, in unreported tests
of individual portfolios, we observe that dispersion is significantly positive for firms in the bottom
two quintiles, indicating that dispersion as a factor may have even greater significance for smaller
firms not in the S&P 500 Index. HML is significantly and positively related to excess returns, while
the momentum factor is significantly and negatively related to excess returns. On average, disper-
sion captures nine to 26 basis points of excess return, depending on the model employed. Using the
adjusted-R2 as a diagnostic, the model with the best fit is Model 9, which includes the four-factor
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model, plus the long-term dispersion factor (adj-R2 = 0.9725), followed by Model 7 which incorpo-
rates the short-term dispersion factor (adj-R2 = 0.9718). Generally, the pricing errors of the models are
small and insignificantly different from zero. Models with the lowest pricing errors are the four-factor
model and the four-factor model with long-term dispersion.31
Evident from the factor model analysis, a factor for dispersion cannot fully compensate for the
explanatory power of fundamental factors, but the inclusion of this factor does improve the fit of the
factor models, especially for small firms. In the next section, we create estimates of asset returns and
volatility from the 15 factor models. We then determine which models best predict out-of-sample
returns and return variances.
4.3 Using factor models to estimate returns and volatility of S&P 500
firms
Does the choice of factor model have implications for portfolio management? We investigate this
issue by examining the out-of-sample predictive ability of traditional factors and the heterogeneity
factor for returns and variance. We estimate 60-month rolling regressions beginning every month
from January 1991 through the remaining sample period, using both individual securities as well as
portfolios formed on size and book-to-market.32 As noted in Griffin (2002), we estimate the time-
series regressions without intercept terms because this has been shown to generate more accurate
estimates (Fama and French 1997, Simin 2000). We then implement the methodology detailed above
to calculate both return estimates [similar to that detailed in Griffin (2002)] and variance estimates
(Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok 1999).
We construct forecasts of stock returns using Fama and French (1997) methodology for the 15
factor models for both individual firms and portfolio returns, where portfolios are formed on size and
book-to-market factors. There is a general consensus that expected returns are notoriously difficult
to predict. Overall, none of the models does a particularly good job of predicting out-of-sample
returns, and we do not find substantial deviations in the predictive power of a variety of models.
More parsimonious models are slightly better, but forecasts of returns from all models underestimate
actual returns. The results are not surprising given the strong market for most of the actualization
period. Forecasts from models that excluded the market had marginally improved fit, as measured
22
by adjusted-R2. Similar results are obtained when portfolios of the S&P 500 stocks are examined,
indicating that factor models do not perform well in estimating out-of-sample returns, regardless of
their ability to explain in-sample returns, as shown in Section 4.2.33
In Table 4, we examine whether the addition of dispersion factors in conjunction with models of
fundamental factors improves the predictability of out-of-sample return variances. We implement the
methodology detailed in Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok (1999) for estimating return variances for
individual securities variances. Their results indicate the estimates from more parsimonious models
(historical market variance and historical security variance) have the lowest forecast errors and the
highest correlations with realized variances.
In predicting out-of-sample volatility, Model 10, where short-term dispersion is the only factor
is the best estimate of individual security return variance. When the factor for short-term dispersion
is the sole estimator, the slope and the correlation between the estimate and the realized variance
is maximized (0.5457). The model also has the highest adjusted-R2 of the models tested (0.3051).
The market model (Model 1) and the market accompanied by short-term dispersion (Model 4) are
also good models for predicting volatility. Similar to the findings of Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok
(1999), more parsimonious models have better prediction ability than the complex multifactor mod-
els. Models that contain the Fama-French three-factor specification tend to have the largest standard
deviation, but also the lowest forecast averages, indicating that these models underestimate individual
firm volatility. These models also perform the most poorly in prediction as given by their correlation
coefficients and the fit of each model. We observe the short-term dispersion model arrives at better
forecasts of individual stock variance than even the market. These results may occur because unlike
the other factors that rely upon historical data, earnings forecasts are forward-looking expectations,
which are significantly related to both future returns and volatility of firms.
5 Behavioral expectations
The heterogeneity of beliefs and risk tolerance are basic premises of the behavioral decision-making
literature. The emphasis in behavioral finance is on how psychologicalbiasesaffect investor behavior
and prices. Investors’ subjective return distributions are at times too high (too optimistic or overcon-
fident) or too low (too pessimistic). These behavioral features have prompted a substantial debate
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about many key issues ranging from predictability of asset returns and plausible explanations based
on investor biases, regarding momentum and long-run reversals, equity premium and risk free rate
puzzles, to name just a few.34
In this section we introduce the behavioral elements of amplification and bias into the model
described in Section 1. Amplification magnifies the differences among analyst forecasts. Biases
allow the beliefs of analysts to be systematically different from the beliefs of agents. Effectively
biases adjust the conditional means of analyst forecasts whereas amplification adjusts the variance
(and higher moments) of forecasts across analysts. The first subsection pertains to amplifying beliefs
whereas the second subsection pertains to biases. The final subsection relates our models to Shefrin’s
work on sentiments and pricing kernels.
5.1 Amplifying beliefs
The diversity of analyst forecasts used in our empirical work may not fully represent the diversity of
beliefs in the economy as a whole. Financial analysts receive similar training, work in institutions
with similar goals, and interact in a community of other financial analysts. It is likely the views of
financial analysts will under-represent the views of agents in the economy as a whole since many
other agents will have much different experiences and points of view.35
Another reason the diversity of analyst forecasts may not fully represent the diversity of beliefs in
the economy is that it is perhaps in the interest of analysts to understate their beliefs. Analysts may
face pressure to state forecasts that are not too far out of line with analysts at other institutions. It
may be optimal for analysts to understate their beliefs to perform well in their job. When an analyst’s
constructed return forecast indicates that he believes that the return on an asset is going to be 0.01
higher than the market, he may really mean that he believes it is going to be 0.05 higher but in case
he is wrong and the asset under-performs the market he hedges his estimate. If he reported 0.05 and
that turns out to be wrong, he may lose credibility in the future if all other analysts were much less
optimistic. If 0.05 is right and he reports 0.01, he may still get credit and be rewarded if he had the
highest forecast among analysts.
Therefore, the heterogeneity of beliefs present in our sample may under/over represent the het-
erogeneity of beliefs in the economy. In this subsection, we continue to assume that the diversity of
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analyst forecasts correctly measures the direction of agents’ beliefs but not their magnitudes. Con-
sequently we introduce a parameterθ that can amplify or dampen heterogeneity by amplifying or
dampening the stated beliefs of financial analysts.36 We now let the ratio of beliefs of typei agents of





















whereµ̄git+1|t is the conditional expectation of consumption growth stated by financial analysti and
µ̄pit+1|t is the conditional expectation of the return on stockp stated by financial analysti.37 Note that
we still link the beliefs of typei agents to those of analysti, but we no longer require them to be equal
to the stated by beliefs of analysti. Our previous analysis is a special case in whichθ is assumed to
be one. Whenθ is greater than one then the heterogeneity among analysts is amplified and when it is
less than one but greater than zero it is dampened.
Following our discussion at the beginning of this section, there are two interpretations of ampli-
fication. The first interpretation is that financial analysts really believe their stated forecasts,µ̄gt+1|t
andµ̄pt+1|t for all p, but to obtain the beliefs of agents we need to amplify the forecasts of analysts.
The second interpretation is that financial analysts understate their true beliefs and by amplifying their
beliefs we can recover their true beliefs which also are the beliefs of agents. For our analysis it does
not matter which interpretation is correct, though the language we use in the rest of the paper follows
the second interpretation. Regardless of the interpretation, equations (21) and (22) can be viewed as
maintaining limited rational expectations in which the true conditional expectations of consumption













which are equal to the weighted means of the amplified beliefs stated by analysts,
Including θ gives us a convenient way to test for the importance of including analyst forecasts.
The formula forhpt is still given by equation (12), though the specifications ofµgit+1|t/µgt+1|t and
µpit+1|t/µpt+1|t have changed. Whenθ is zero the forecasts of analysts have no effect on asset pricing
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sincehpt = 1. If estimates ofθ turn out to be significantly different from zero then there is evidence
that analyst forecasts do matter for asset pricing. In Section 6 we will estimateθ. If the beliefs of
analysts are symmetric then the sign ofθ does not affect the value ofhpt.38
For our empirical analysis we only need the ratio of beliefs given in equations (21) and (22). We do
not need to determineµgit+1|t andµpit+1|t. If one tookµgit+1|t andµpit+1|t to be the numerators of the
right hand side of equations (21) and (22) then the mean of beliefs across analysts can be unreasonably
large whenθ is large. This mean can easily be reduced to sensible levels without changing the ratios
by dividing the beliefs of analysts by any number which is constant across analysts at a given date.
The number can vary across dates. See Section 6.1 for more discussion and an example.
5.2 Incorporating biases
The starting point of behavioral models is that the economy as a whole features biases. In previous
sections we have assumed the beliefs of financial analysts are unbiased proxies for the beliefs of
agents. In this section we allow for biases. We use data on the buy/sell recommendations of analysts
to approximate the difference of the beliefs of analysts and agents. When a financial analyst strongly
recommends buying a stock we view this as signifying that the analyst views the future prospects
of the stock more favorably than agents. Since our models require the beliefs of agents, we adjust
the return forecasts of financial analysts by analyst recommendations. We continue to maintain the
assumption that financial analysts are correct (where their beliefs are given by equations (21) and
(22)) on average about actual expected returns.
Financial analysts provide recommendations on many different stocks. Their recommendations
are classified into five categories: strong sell, sell, hold, buy, and strong buy. We assign the following
point structure for financial analysti’s recommendation of stockj
Rij =





2 if strong buy
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so that a higher number indicates a stronger positive recommendation. Our analysis uses a single
measure of the recommendations ofall financial analysts about a portfolio of stocks where we have
the recommendations of several investment houses for each stock in the portfolio.39 We construct this







when there arem stocks in the portfolio andI financial analysts. Hereλi is a measure of the impor-
tance of financial analysti andϑj is a measure of the market share of stockj. We require
∑I
i=1 λi = 1,∑m
j=1 ϑj = 1, λi ≥ 0, andϑj ≥ 0.
Many researchers have studied the bias of financial analysts with respect to ex post realizations. In
this paper we assume that the return forecasts of financial analysts are not biased but agents’ beliefs
can be biased. Although some evidence suggests financial analysts provide biased predictions of
reality [see Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2002) for a comprehensive overview of analyst biases],
most of the emphasis in the literature concerns individual stocks. For the portfolios discussed in
this paper it is plausible that financial analysts are not biased. In Table 5 we see that the difference
between the unconditional return forecasts and the actual market return is very small. For other assets
the differences are slightly larger but still arguably small.
In this paper biases are situations in which agents and analysts disagree. Since analysts’ return
forecasts are assumed to be correct on average when there is a wedge between the beliefs of agents
and analysts, agents have biased beliefs of reality. However, we do not allow for biases in all variables.
We assume that there are no biases between financial analysts and individuals, on average, across all
stocks at any date. Thus in our model, individuals and financial analysts have the same beliefs about
the performance of the market portfolio.40 We also assume that individuals and financial analysts
have exactly the same beliefs about nominal risk-free bonds, whose returns are known with certainty
in nominal terms. To the extent individuals and analysts disagree about future inflation this is a
poor assumption. In addition, for convenience we assume there are no biases in the beliefs about
consumption growth. For all other assets and portfolios there can be biases.
Although we assume analysts’ return forecasts are unbiased, the language that analysts use to state
recommendations may be biased. It is well known that analysts on average recommend buying stocks.
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For our sample in Table 5 we see that the average recommendation across all analysts of the market
is 0.8118. This average is only across stocks for which we have recommendations as we do not have
recommendations for all stocks in the market. Since we assume on average there are no biases, we
need to adjust for favorable recommendations. We letζ be the adjustment factor. We will consider
models in whichζ is set to 0.8118 and, for comparison purposes, models in which it is set to 0.9.
We take a recommendation ofζ for a portfolio to indicate that agents should hold their position. In
the rest of this paper when we say a financial analyst recommends holding a stock we mean that the
recommendation for the portfolio isζ. Any recommendation above (below) this signifies a buy (sell)
recommendation. The difference between the recommendation andζ measures the strength of the buy
(sell) recommendation.
Our approach views the recommendations of analysts as comments on thecurrent beliefs of
agents. When analysts strongly recommend agents buy a stock, analysts think agents are too pes-
simistic about the stock. Equivalently, analysts think if agents had the correct beliefs then the stock is
underpriced. However, agents are optimizing and under their beliefs the stock is correctly priced. This
interpretation can be problematic if agents adjust their beliefs upon hearing the recommendations of
analysts and analysts do not immediately revise their recommendations. For example, if upon hearing
a change in recommendations from hold (ζ) to buy (an average level of recommendations greater than
ζ), agents update their beliefs, so that their beliefs are identical to the beliefs of analysts then the price
of the stock should rise so that the stock is correctly priced under the updated beliefs. After the rise,
the stock is no longer an attractive buy, and analysts should revise their recommendations to beζ.
There is some evidence which bears on this issue. In practice, analyst recommendations are generally
long term in nature, while prices are continually updated as individual beliefs change. There is evi-
dence (Womack 1996, Michaely and Womack 1999) that agents adjust their beliefs upon hearing the
recommendations of analysts. However, as Michaely and Womack (1999) report, the adjustments are
insufficient to bring their expectations in line with analysts.
We make an assumption about how the beliefs of agents are tied to the beliefs of the analysts:
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Assumption 6 The ratio of beliefs of typei agents about the conditional mean of consumption growth























[−d (bpt+1|t − ζ)] (24)
whereµ̄git+1|t is the conditional expectation of consumption growth stated by financial analysti and
µ̄pit+1|t is the conditional expectation of the return on stockp stated by financial analysti.
Appendix C justifies the specification forµpit+1|t/µpt+1|t in Assumption 6 using arguments based on
optimizing behavior. We do not adjust analysti’ beliefs by analysti’s recommendation to obtain the
beliefs of typei agents but rather adjust analysti’ beliefs by the average level of recommendations
across all analysts. The constantd is a parameter which is constant across stocks and measures the
extent to which recommendations signify differences in the beliefs of analysts and agents. If there
are no differences thend = 0 and there is no informational content in analyst recommendations. Our
previous analysis is a special case in whichd is assumed to be zero. Whend > 0, if analysts strongly
recommend buying a stock then agents are pessimistic about the stock relative to analysts. In this case













Here the right hand side can be interpreted as the ratio of beliefs of analysti bout the conditional
mean of the return on stockp to the true conditional mean. Whend > 0, if analysts strongly rec-
ommend selling a stock then agents are optimistic about the stock relative to analysts. In this case
bpt+1|t < ζ and the inequality in equation (25) is reversed. We estimated in later sections and find
it to be positive, though usually not significantly different from zero. The parameterθ is included to
allow for amplification andζ is included to allow for biased language in recommendation statements.
We continue to assume a limited form of rational expectations in which the average amplified
beliefs of analysts are rational. Because of Assumption 6 agents on average are correct about con-







[−d (bpt+1|t − ζ)] . (26)
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Analysts are still correct on average about all stocks. In Section 2 we imposed equations (15) and
(16) which stated that agents are correct on average about the conditional means of asset returns and
consumption growth. It was noted that this restriction does not imply we have nothing to say about the
distributions of other variables since we do not assume that weighted average forecasts of all variables
are correct. Thus, even in our earlier models the economy as a whole can be biased in some variables.
The analysis in this section effectively broadens the scope of potential biases to include mean stock
returns.
5.3 Behaviorally-based decompositions
In section 1.4 we decomposed the expected return of an asset into fundamental and heterogeneity
components. When there is no disagreement, at datet, hpt = 1 and the heterogeneity component is
zero. With our biased beliefs specification in the previous section the pricing equation is again given
by equation (11) andhpt is given by equation (12). Nowhpt includes components related to bias in
conditional mean stock returns, in addition to heterogeneity components, since the beliefs of agents
about conditional mean stock returns can be biased. Even if all agents have identical beliefshpt n ed
not equal one if beliefs about conditional mean stock returns are biased. The decomposition in Section
1.4 still applies with the new specification of beliefs.
Shefrin (2001) formulates a similar decomposition in a different way. Shefrin (2001) shows that
the log-pricing kernel can be decomposed into two stochastic processes, one pertaining to fundamen-
tals and the other pertaining to sentiments where the latter refers to the errors in the expectations of
a stand-in representative agent. Prices are efficient whenever the sentiment component is uniformly
zero. Shefrin’s sentiment component can include the effects of heterogeneity, biases and irrational
beliefs. The decomposition set forth in Shefrin (2001) is easiest to state in terms of notation similar
to that used in our Appendix A as it is driven by a likelihood ratioπR (ωv|ωs) /π (ωv|ωs) . The ratio
involves on the one handπ (ωv|ωs) , which is the true probability, based on information available at
time s that the history of states will actually beωv at timev. On the other hand, it involves at times,
the representative agent beliefsπR (ωv|ωs) , which are a weighted average of the beliefs of individual
agents. Whenever the two probabilitiesπR (ωv|ωs) andπ (ωv|ωs) coincide, the representative agent
holds correct beliefs and the sentiment component in the Shefrin (2001) decomposition disappears.
In any other situation, there is a sentiment component present in the pricing kernel due to biased ag-
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gregate beliefs. Shefrin’s approach is an elegant way to characterize the importance of sentiments on
asset returns.41
6 GMM estimation of models with heterogeneity and biases
In this section we estimate structural models of the stochastic discount factor described in earlier
sections. In Section 6.1 we estimate the heterogeneous agent model without biases and in Section 6.2
we include biases. Our results suggest that both heterogeneity and bias matter for asset pricing.






holds for any asset. We estimate a model with five assets using GMM (Hansen 1982) without any
instruments.42 The five assets are the market, a nominal risk-free bond, a portfolio of stocks with a
high degree of past volatility, a portfolio of stocks with a high degree of dispersion among analysts
short-term forecasts and a portfolio of stocks with a high degree of dispersion among analysts long-
term forecasts. We assume there is no disagreement about the return on the nominal risk-free bond,b,
so thatµbit+1|t = µbt+1|t for all i. All asset returns and consumption growth are in real terms and we
use the monthly CPI for inflation. We measure consumption with the sum of monthly services and
non-durables.
In Section 6.1, for any assetp, hpt is formed using the amplified beliefs presented in equations
(21) and (22). In Section 6.2, for any assetp, hpt is formed using the amplified beliefs with biases
presented in equations (23) and (24). Both sections set
log µ̄git+1|t = q̄t + φ log µ̄mit+1|t (28)
for analysts. Note that when forminghpt the value of̄qt cancels and that̄qt need not equalqt. (Recall
that qt was defined in Assumption 3.) The formula forhpt involves the current Pareto weights of
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agents and we approximate for the Pareto weights using Assumption 5. We update the Pareto weights
once a year.43
6.1 Heterogeneity
In this subsection we discuss estimates of various combinations ofθ, β, andγ in the consumption-
based model without biases. Each panel of Table 6 presents estimates of the same 12 models except
that panel A fixesφ at one and panel B fixesφ at 0.05. In models one through three, we estimate only
θ for several different values ofγ. In models four through six we estimate versions of the model in
which all agents have the same beliefs. These models are obtained by settingθ = 0 and consequently
do not use data on analyst forecasts.44 In models seven through nine we setθ = 1 so that the beliefs
of agents are unamplified. In models 10 through 12 we estimate the amplification of beliefs,θ, along
with various combinations of other parameters.
If financial agents were a random sample from the population and accurately reported their fore-
casts we would expect that models in whichθ = 1 would perform better than models which ignored
analyst forecasts and setθ = 0. Our results confirm this because models seven, eight, and nine which
setθ = 1 do better than the corresponding models four, five, and six which setθ = 0. Though, the
gains from increasingθ from zero to one are extremely small. For example consider the reduction
in the GMM objective from going from model seven, which is the best model which restrictsθ to
be zero, to model nine, which is the best model which restrictsθ to be one. The GMM objective is
reduced from 0.3692 to 0.3618 in panel A and from 0.3692 to 0.3690 in panel B.
To understand why the gains are small it is helpful to study the magnitudes of the differences
in forecasts presented in Figure 2. In this figure we graph the ratio of the most optimistic return
forecast to the most pessimistic return forecast across investment houses. Although there is a lot of
dispersion in forecasts in the high short term portfolio there is less dispersion in market forecasts.
Since the dispersion in market forecasts is low the dispersion in consumption forecasts is low due to
Assumption 3. If there is very little dispersion in consumption forecasts thenhpt is close to one unless
there is much dispersion in assetp. In the extreme case in which there is no dispersion in consumption
forecasts thenhpt is exactly one no matter how much dispersion there is in assetp. Hence, from the
decomposition in Section 1.4, heterogeneity will have a small effect.
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It might be the case that the dispersion in analyst forecasts has the right direction but the wrong
magnitude. To investigate this, in models 10 through 12 we estimateθ nd let the data tell us its
appropriate values. When we estimateθ we find that it is usually barely significantly different from
zero. Because of our small data set and our choice to not use the optimal GMM weighting matrix it is
not surprising that the standard errors of our parameter estimates are large. In most of our models all
of the parameters are usually just barely significant.
We find that estimates ofθ vary dramatically from -4.60 to 476.05. Part of the reason for the large
differences in estimates is that there is a tradeoff betweenγ andθ. In models one through three we see
that if γ is fixed at a low value then the optimal estimate ofθ is large. Ifγ is fixed at a high value then
the optimal estimate ofθ is small. This tradeoff is also apparent in models 10 through 12. In model
10 in whichγ is fixed at five, the optimal estimates ofθ are much larger than whenγ is in models 11
and 12. This happens because values ofγ are much larger than five.
At first glance one may think that our estimates ofθ range from being unreasonably negative to
being unreasonably large and positive. If we consider what negative and large positiveθ’ imply for
beliefs most of our estimates are perhaps reasonable. The plots in Figure 2 suggest that amplifications
of 10, -4 and maybe even 50 are plausible for the market. Whenθ = 10, the the ratio of the most
optimistic forecast to the least optimistic forecast of the gross market (monthly) return varies over time
from about 1.005 to 1.014. Whenθ = −4, it varies between about 1.002 and 1.006. Whenθ = 50 it
varies between about 1.03 and about 1.08. For the market, 1.08 is high but perhaps plausible. Looking
at the high short term dispersion portfolio, we see that an amplification of 10 entails a ratio that can
be as high as 1.70. This is large but perhaps plausible since by construction this portfolio includes
stocks that analysts disagree about. However, for the short term dispersion portfolio an amplification
of 50 is implausible: it implies that the ratio of the most optimistic forecast to the most pessimistic
monthly forecast varies over time between about 2.0 and 14.0.
To understand the implications of amplification consider an example in whichθ = 10 and the most
optimistic analyst’s unamplified forecast of the gross market return is 1.011 and the most pessimistic
analyst’s unamplified forecast is 1.010. If we let the beliefs of agents be given by the numerator
of the right hand side of equation (22) then the beliefs of agents who correspond to the optimistic
and pessimistic analysts are 1.1156 and 1.1046 respectively which are, perhaps, unreasonably high.












. This ratio is unaffected if we replacēµmit+1|t for all i with
µ̄mit+1|t/ηt for any constantηt. We could setηt = 1.1 and let the beliefs of the agents who correspond
to the optimistic and pessimistic analysts be 1.0142 and 1.0042. These beliefs are plausible and would
not change the parameter estimates in our consumption-based model. Note that we are free to divide
by different constants at different dates and our empirical results would not change.
6.2 Biases
Table 7 provides estimates of the consumption-based model when there are biases. We estimate 12
different combinations ofd, θ, β, andγ for two different values ofζ andφ. The assets are the same
as in the previous subsection, though the 12 models do not correspond to the 12 models estimated in
Tables 6. In models one through four,φ is fixed at one andζ is fixed at 0.8118. In models five and
six, φ is fixed at 0.05 andζ is fixed at 0.8118. In models seven through ten,φ is fixed at one andζ is
fixed at 0.9. In models 11 and 12,φ is fixed at 0.05 andζ is fixed at 0.9.
When we include biases we find that optimal estimates ofd are remarkably stable and range
between 0.04 and 0.06. Ifd = 0.05 and ζ = 0.8118 then when analysts on average state a buy
recommendation, analysts are about 1% more optimistic than individuals about returns on the asset
sinceexp [−d (1 − ζ)] ≈ .99. If d = 0.05 andζ = 0.8118 then when analysts on average state a hold
recommendation, analysts are about 4% more pessimistic than individuals about returns on the asset
sinceexp [−d (0 − ζ)] ≈ 1.04. We find both of these numbers reasonable.
Whenζ = 0.8118, φ = 1 and we estimated, θ, β, andγ the value of the GMM criterion is 0.1849,
which is much lower than it was when we setd = 0 and estimatedθ, β andγ in model 12 of Table 6.
Both dispersion and bias seem to be important. In model three, when we don’t allow for dispersion
and estimated, β, andγ the model does not do as well. In models nine and ten we see that when
ζ is fixed at 0.9, this is not always the case. In these models dispersion adds very little over bias
which suggest in some circumstances biases may be more important than dispersion. However, since
model four does better than model 10, we believe our evidence shows both dispersion and bias matter.
Though our estimates ofθ andd are usually not significantly different from zero.
It is well known from Hansen and Singleton (1982), Mehra and Prescott (1985), Hansen and
Jagannathan (1991), Kocherlakota (1996) and many others, that in consumption-based models optimal
34
estimates ofγ tend to be unreasonably large whenθ is restricted to be zero.45 Many researchers
consider any estimate ofγ larger than five to be unreasonable. Moreover consumption-based models
have a difficult time accounting for the difference between returns on stocks and returns on risk-free
bonds. This is referred to as the equity premium puzzle. Can including analyst forecasts help resolve
the equity premium puzzle? The standard model has trouble accounting for the equity premium
because the variance of consumption growth and the correlation of consumption growth with stock
returns is low. In the models presented in this paper, the agents’ perceived variance of unconditional
consumption growth increases and the agents perceived unconditional correlation with stock returns
is affected. However our results indicate that our model can not satisfactorily account for the equity
premium. In addition, although there is a tradeoff betweenθ andγ, the estimates ofγ are still too
large. Interestingly whenγ andθ are jointly estimated the estimates ofγ can be larger than whenθ is
fixed at zero. One possible reason for this is that whenθ = 0, γ affects the value ofhpt.
7 Conclusions
The contribution of this paper is to empirically implement dynamic general equilibrium models with
heterogeneous agents, being careful about measuring agents’ actual beliefs. We examine whether the
heterogeneity of beliefs is priced and show factors constructed from the disagreement among analysts
about expected (short-term and long-term) earnings is a risk factor affecting both expected returns
and volatility. While previous research has documented positive and significant association between
dispersion, returns and volatility, almost none of these tests have examined how dispersion affects
asset pricing models.46 Second, we establish the out-of-sample properties of dispersion in predicting
volatility and returns. We suggest the disagreement among analysts about expected earnings is a good
proxy that measures the heterogeneity of beliefs and has attributes that correspond to the theoretical
predictions. We show dispersion of earnings forecasts is a priced factor in traditional factor asset
pricing models and is a good predictor of return volatility in out-of-sample tests. Our results indicate
dispersion has better out-of-sample properties for individual firms than for portfolios of stocks, but
the general findings about the importance of a factor that captures the heterogeneity of beliefs still
remains.
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Next, having established that the heterogeneity of beliefs matters for asset pricing we turn our
attention to estimating a structural model. We develop a model in which agents have the correct
beliefs about expected consumption growth but possibly incorrect beliefs about all other variables
including the higher moments of consumption growth. We link the beliefs of agents about expected
stock returns to the stated beliefs of analysts allowing the beliefs to differ according to the average
level of recommendations. Since there is a representative agent whose beliefs are a weighted beliefs
of analysts, the impact of heterogeneity is channelled through its affect on average beliefs. As in
Shefrin (2001) the mean beliefs may not equal the true beliefs. When they don’t heterogeneity/bias
matter. We estimate the discount factorβ and risk aversion parameterγ and the determinants of
agents’ beliefs via analyst forecasts. Our results suggest that including analyst forecasts can improve
the performance of asset pricing models. However the estimates of the parameters which determine
amplification and bias are usually not significant.
It is common to ignore the heterogeneity of beliefs in empirical asset pricing models. Implement-
ing such models can be troublesome and the available data can be of low quality. Our paper is an
attempt to address these issues, suggesting factor specifications and suggesting how to empirically
incorporate the heterogeneity of beliefs in stochastic discount fundamental asset pricing equations.
The results in our paper suggest that heterogeneity is a “missing factor” when it comes to predicting
returns and volatility. The results also suggest that traditional asset pricing models have improved
empirical fits when heterogeneity is taken into account.
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Appendix A. Pricing with heterogeneous agents
This appendix derives equation (5). We use more formal notation than in the text. Letωt b the state of the economy at
time t which captures both exogenous and endogenous information. We take the number of possible values ofωt for a
given t to be finite, though our approach applies more generally. Letωt = (ω0 . . . ωt) be the history of states from time
zero to timet. Let πi (ωv|ωs) be the probability, based on information available in the historyωs, that agents of typei
believe that the history of states will beωv at timev. Let π (ωv|ωs) be the true probability, based on information available
in the historyωs, that the history of states will actually beωv at timev. If the history of states isωt at timet then let
ct (ωt) be aggregate consumption,cit (ωt) be the consumption of agenti, λit (ωt) be the Pareto weight of agenti, and
αit (ωt) be the fraction of aggregate consumption that agenti consumes. Also consider an asset which has a timet price




at timet + 1.
Let there beI agents who have identical power reward functions with the same discount factor. To compute an

































are the initial Pareto weights which we construct to sum to one.








































can be written so that they only depend on the current Pareto weights,λit (ωt). The current Pareto weights are defined










j=1 λjt (ωt) πj (ωt+1|ωt)
. (A4)
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The denominator normalizes the term so that the timePareto weights sum to one. If agents have the same beliefs then


















































































to reflect the change in the distribution of wealth from periodst to t + 1. Notice that if agents have logarithmic reward





































Equation (A5) is a formal version of equation (5) in the text.
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Appendix B. Correct higher order log conditional central
moments
We show that Assumption 2 implies that all agents correctly know the second and higher order conditional central moments













yt+1 + log µxit+1|t − log µxt+1|t
)
dξxt (yt+1)
= log µxit+1|t − log µxt+1|t + µ∗xt+1|t
whereµ∗xt+1|t is the true conditional mean oflog xt+1. Then > 1 conditional central moment oflog xt+1 from the point
of view of agenti is
∫ (




















which is the equal to the actualnth conditional central moment oflog xt+1. This argument can be extended to the case in
whichx is a vector.
Appendix C. Justification of Assumption 6
This appendix justifies the specification ofµpit+1|t/µpt+1|t in Assumption 6. Let the ratio of the beliefs of financial






















where the term in parenthesis is equal tocis. At time t the derivative of this utility function with respect to holdings of
assetp between periodst andt + 1 is



















where we use Assumption 2 to replaceEit in equation (C2) withEt. Since agents maximize their utility, given their
beliefs,Dipt will always equal zero. Moreover, the derivative of a typei agent’s lifetime utility function using the beliefs
of financial analysti is





















whereĒit denotes the expectation with respect to analysti’s beliefs. We have used the fact that there are no biases in









whered is a positive constant. Notice that the right hand side does not depend oni. When financial analysts on average
recommend holding stockp, (so thatbpt+1|t = ζ) we view that as indicating analysts believe agents are optimizing under
analysts’ beliefs and henceDipt = D̄ipt = 0. When financial analysts on average recommend buying a stock (bpt+1|t >
ζ), analysts believe that agents could obtain more utility by purchasing more of stockp, and hencēDipt > 0 = Dipt.
When financial analysts on average recommend selling a stock (bpt+1|t < ζ), we view that as indicating analysts believe
agents could obtain more utility by selling stockp and hencēDipt < 0 = Dipt. Rearranging equation (C3) usingDipt = 0





























Dividing equation (C7) by equation (C8) and rearranging terms yields the formula given in Assumption 6 of the text.
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Notes
1For example see the arguments presented in Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (2000).
2It is impossible to cite the many papers in this area. See, however, the recent surveys and general
discussions by Barberis and Thaler (2002) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2002).
3An earlier version of the decomposition in Section 1.4 that applied to the model of Detemple and
Murthy (1994) appeared in Ghysels and Juergens (2001). That version only applied when agents have
logarithmic utility and did not link the beliefs of agents to available data. The earlier version was
written independently and simultaneously to the work by Shefrin (2001) who reported similar results
and related them to the behavioral finance literature. The latter will be further discussed in Section
5. The more general version of the decomposition included in this paper was written before we were
aware of the work of Shefrin (2001).
4The agent’s labor income does not enter this equation and will play no direct role in this paper.
5In an ideal world, we would not only have mean forecasts across analysts for each stock, but we
would also have some measure of dispersion of each analysts’ beliefs regarding the distribution of
forecasts. Graham and Harvey (2003), using survey data of CFOs about the expected risk premium,
are able to obtain a distribution of beliefs for each individual respondent. In the future, work along
the lines of Graham and Harvey (2003) may eventually yield more data regarding the distribution of
beliefs for individual stocks or portfolios.
6We thank the referee for the suggestion to call the following assumption homotopy.
7In this paper the vectorx will consist of variables which are gross returns and hence non-negative
by construction. We make the additional assumption thatµxt+1|t andµxit+1|t for all i are strictly
positive.
8This is true from the point of view of an econometrician faced with a fixed data set. In general,
since heterogeneity can affect the return of assets it also can affect covt(g
−γ
t+1, rpt+1) and hence can
alter the fundamental component of the return.
9Throughout this paper, unless explicitly said otherwise, we use “analyst” to refer to the fictitious
analyst constructed from the views of all analysts in a particular brokerage house.
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10The computations of the conditional mean forecast of stock returns is described in Section 3.2.
11We assume that agents do not use the fact that the analysts are correct on average when formulat-
ing their beliefs.
12Since consumption growth is an endogenous variable chosen by agents, an increase in dispersion
of consumption is interpreted as increase in the dispersion of the information available to agents which
in turn creates dispersion in their optimal choices.
13This data along with a description of how the factors are formed is available on Ken French’s
web site.
14The average returns reported within are more closely aligned with those found by Griffin (2002)
who also examines a later time period (1981-1995) than Daniel and Titman (1997) and Fama and
French (1993).
15Qu, Starks, and Yan (2003) construct factors for both short-term earnings forecast dispersion
which impacts returns through differing private information as well as the volatility of that dispersion
which captures uncertainty about firm fundamentals. However, they argue that rather than being
“new” factors, dispersion captures elements of other well-documented, but often less easily explained,
risk factors such as size and book-to-market.
16Womack (1996) documents price drift measurable up to six months following a recommendation
change.
17Given the documented biases that exist in analyst forecasts, we will explicitly test this hypothesis.
This material is deferred to Section 6 as we only deal with dispersion here.
18We believe this is reasonable considering that one metric used in ranking analysts is the timeliness
and accuracy of forecasts. Stickel (1992) shows compensation is directly linked to rankings, thus
forecasts should be updated as beliefs about valuation change.
19Other breakpoints, including quintiles and deciles were examined. The results are robust to
various specifications of high and low dispersion.
20Alternatively, we can rely on the short-sale restriction literature for justification of high dispersion
firms having greater risk than low dispersion firms. Chen, Hong, and Stein (2000) show as the breadth
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of ownership decreases (conversely, the dispersion of agents’ beliefs increases), expected returns
decline. Thus we could expect similar results for analysts’ forecasts as well, where high forecast
dispersion firms would have lower future expected returns. However, we have no reason to believe
that short-sale constraints would necessarily be binding for high dispersion firms.
21The six brokerage firms that we include are Credit Suisse First Boston, Lehman Brothers, Paine
Webber, Prudential Bache, Salomon Brothers, and Smith Barney.
22The justification of using a modification of the constant dividend discount model can be found in
Brav, Lehavy, and Michaely (2003); Crombez (2001); Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001); and
Guay, Kothari, and Shu (2003); among others.
23One reason for this is that customers might become confused if different analysts within a bro-
kerage gave different predictions for the same stock.
24Medians, rather than upper and lower quartile rankings, are used because of the limited size of
the sample in each month.
25Ideally, the Pareto weights should be based on consumption or wealth shares of agents. Unfortu-
nately data on assets under management are not readily obtainable nor comparable among the various
institutions we include in our study.
26 The factors they examine include the Fama-French factors (Fama and French 1993), technical
or past-return factors (Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok 1996, Jegadeesh and Titman 1993), macroe-
conomic factors (Fama and Gibbons 1984), principal component or statistical factors (Connor and
Korajcyzk 1988), and the return on the market portfolio.
27When we move to the empirical investigation of structural asset pricing models our analysis will
be more discriminatory with regards to such alternative interpretations.
28The latter is also closely related to the work of Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and numerous
subsequent papers that try to test whether less liquid assets have a premium and are held by a different
clientele, which have longer investment horizons. Here heterogeneity pertains to investment horizons,
not beliefs, and therefore is a separate issue.
29Although the CAPM is the standard benchmark for asset pricing models, standard asset pricing
models based on the CAPM do not do very well at predicting returns or volatility out of sample.
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Therefore, we include models which exclude the market in an attempt to determine whether non-
market based factors have superior predictive ability for either returns or volatility.
30Fama-MacBeth regressions are also performed. While the parameter estimates and their sta-
tistical significance are quantitatively similar to those presented in Table 3, the fit of the models is
substantially reduced (adjusted-R2s are approximately 13%). Results are available upon request. In-
dividual portfolios based on size and book-to-market breakpoints as well as the aggregate of these
portfolios are also examined. In the aggregate, only the market factor is significant in the models 1-9,
while models 10-15 indicate that dispersion factors are positively and significantly related to portfolio
excess returns and HML is negatively and significantly related to portfolio excess returns. Moreover,
time series regressions that utilize the original Fama-French factors provide results similar to those
found in Fama and French (1993), implying that the results obtained are not likely sample specific and
dispersion may be a priced risk factor for other firms. Individual portfolio results are also available
upon request.
31A two-step regression analysis is also performed. Residuals from excess returns projected onto
traditional factors are projected onto the dispersion factors. We find that dispersion is significantly
related to the residuals and explain between 3% and 25% of the pricing error. Results are available
upon request.
32Unlike the analysis performed in the previous subsections, we use individual firm data rather
than a value-weighted portfolio for estimating returns and volatilities out-of-sample. Because of the
limited First Call data, we do not have complete 60-month rolling samples in the early years. Since
the initial First Call data on both short-term and long-term forecasts began in earnest in March 1989,
we have only 21 months of data for the initial month of the sample (January 1991). While this could
lead to problems with estimation of returns and variances, we do not find any statistical difference
between those observations with the full 5-year estimation period and those with reduced estimation
periods.
33Results from estimation of out-of-sample returns are available upon request.
34An abundance of references should be cited here which appear in a systematic, organized way in
the recent surveys of Barberis and Thaler (2002) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2002). A detailed
overview of biases in analyst forecasts and recommendations is provided in Section 3.1.1.
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35De Bondt (1993), using primarily experimental settings, observes that individual investors tend
to follow trends, while expert investors mean revert. In contrast, (LaPorta 1996) finds excessive
optimism (pessimism) following good (bad) announcements when he proxies for the beliefs of naive
investors with analyst forecasts.
36When we say “stated beliefs” we mean the return forecasts constructed (using Assumption 4)
from earnings forecasts.
37As mentioned earlier we use “analyst” to refer to the fictitious analyst constructed from the views
of all analysts in a particular brokerage house.
38The notion of symmetry used here is as follows: Letτt be a non-negative constant that can vary
over time and be arbitrarily chosen at any particular date. Beliefs are symmetric if for any the total
Pareto weight on agents who believe the conditional mean of a variable is is equal to the total Pareto
weight of agents who believe the conditional mean isτt/.
39The group of investment houses is held fixed across time and portfolios. See Section 3.2 for more
details.
40Analysts’ stated recommendations for the market vary over time. One could use this to allow for
biases in the market return. Our approach assumes there are never any biases in the market return.
This is partially justified because as we see from Table 5 the stated market recommendations have
a very low standard deviation over time. From a practical standpoint another reason we choose to
assume there are no biases in the market is that we don’t have recommendations for all stocks in the
market.
41This heterogeneity/bias component(hpt) in our work captures all deviations from fundamentals
and plays the same role as the sentiment component in Shefrin (2001). We prefer the label hetero-
geneity/bias component to sentiment component because sentiment has a connotation that agents are
irrational and somehow are using a mechanical procedure to form their beliefs. As Shefrin states in a
book about behavioral finance: “A consistent theme in this book is that sentiment is the reflection of
heuristic-driven bias”, page 53. The heterogeneity/bias component is present because of heterogeneity
and bias whether or not they are heuristically driven.
42We use the fixed weighting matrixW = (Ertr′t)
−1 wherert is the vector of gross returns on the
five assets used in our estimation. The expectation is approximated with the sample average. Hansen
50
and Jagannathan (1997) show that this weighting matrix has a number of appealing properties. While
not all of those properties hold in the setting of this paper, it is a convenient fixed weighting matrix.
43Our theory tell us that the Pareto weights should vary from month to month if agents have differ-
ent beliefs. Holding the Pareto weights fixed during a year is an approximation.
44Whenθ = 0, the value ofφ does not matter so the estimates presented for models four through
six in panel A are identical to the estimates in panel B.
45There have been many proposed solutions to the equity premium puzzle including Campbell and
Cochrane (1999) and Bansal and Yaron (2000). See Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and Barberis, Huang,
and Santos (2001) for proposed behavioral solutions.
46The exception is Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2000), which uses a measure of private infor-
mation and its relation to return in Fama-French type models.
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Figure 1: Average Level of Dispersion throughout the Fiscal Year
The top figure displays the average monthly dispersion of short-term (one-year ahead) analyst earnings forecasts in dollars
for S&P 500 Index firms. The bottom figure shows the average monthly long-term (five-year average growth rate of
earnings) dispersion. Average dispersion is computed as the equal-weighted average of S&P 500 firm’s dispersion in each
month of a firm’s fiscal year (where month 12 is the final month in the fiscal year). Results are reported on an annual basis
as well as averaged across the full sample (1991-1997).





































































Figure 2: Dispersion of beliefs
This figure plots a measure of the dispersion of beliefs for several different values ofθ. Each figure dis-





















In each row, the left figure displays
the ratio for the market portfolio and the right figure displays the ratio for the high short term dispersion portfolio. In row
oneθ = 1, in row twoθ = 10, in row threeθ = 50, and in row fourθ = −4.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for S&P 500 Stocks (1991-1997)
This table provides summary data for the S&P 500 Index firms between 1991 and 1997. Panel A provides summary
statistics. Excess returns (r − rb), market capitalization (Mkt. Cap.), a proxy for firm size, and the book-to-market ratio
(BE/ME) are averaged cross-sectionally across 25 portfolios formed on size and book-to-market (Fama and French 1993).
The dispersion of short-term (Disp. ST) and long-term earnings forecast (Disp. LT), the number of analysts reporting
short-term (Analysts ST) and long-term forecast (Analysts LT), are calculated annually for individual firms. Summary
statistics are based on time series averages across the sample period. Panel B provides a comparison of average returns,
size, book-to-market ratios, institutional ownership and the number of analysts between high and low dispersion portfolios.
Panel C examines the percentage of firms in each year that switch from high to low dispersion (or vice versa), where high
dispersion firms are those with average dispersion above the median. P-values are in parentheses.
Panel A
Summary Statistics of S&P 500 Stocks
Mean Std. Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
r − rb 1.23 0.18 0.98 1.07 1.23 1.37 1.53
Mkt. Cap. 6763 7732 657 2007 3602 6376 26147
BE/ME (%) 0.57 0.31 0.18 0.36 0.52 0.71 1.19
Disp. ST ($) 0.20 0.41 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.21 8.64
Analysts ST 15 7 2 10 15 20 37
Disp. LT (%) 4.14 4.34 0.00 1.95 3.16 4.90 129.27
Analysts LT 12 5 2 8 12 15 33
Panel B
Comparison of High and Low Dispersion Firm Characteristics
Short-term Long-term
Low High t-stat Low High t-stat
r − rb 1.76 1.51 2.98 1.64 1.64 0.02
Mkt. Cap. 8546 6686 4.02 8876 6392 5.39
BE/ME 0.49 0.66 -12.87 0.54 0.60 -4.84
Inst. Own. 0.58 0.60 -3.72 0.57 0.62 -6.93
Analysts 15 16 -3.07 13 13 -0.41
Panel C
Annual Switching Between High and Low Dispersion Portfolios
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Disp. ST 39.60% 29.95% 31.83% 32.48% 31.79% 28.75%
Disp. LT 19.49% 17.61% 16.20% 12.05% 14.68% 14.02%
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Explanatory Factors
Summary data on the independent explanatory factors is provided in this table. The factors include the Fama and French
(1993) risk factors:rm − rb (the systematic risk factor of the excess market return over the risk-free rate), SMB (the risk
factor for small firms over large firms), and HML (the risk factor for high book equity to market equity firms over low book-
to-market firms). A factor to capture momentum, UMD, is also included. Risk factors to capture heterogeneity of beliefs,
DISP (the risk factor between firms with high and low dispersion of earnings forecasts) and LTGDISP (the risk factor
between firms with high and low dispersion of long-term earnings growth forecasts), are also presented. Panel A describes
summary statistics (in returns) which are pooled monthly from January 1991 to December 1997. Autocorrelations through
lag 12 are also included. Panel B provides pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients for the explanatory factors. P-values
are in parentheses.
Panel A
Summary Statistics of Fama-French, Momentum, and Dispersion Factors: N = 84
Autocorr.
Mean Std. Dev. t-stat 1 2 12
rm − rb 1.16 3.09 3.46 -0.21 0.11 -0.06
SMB 0.14 2.68 0.47 0.10 -0.09 0.10
HML 0.47 2.44 1.75 0.21 -0.06 0.13
UMD 0.78 2.52 2.84 0.04 0.01 0.12
DISP -0.28 1.44 -1.75 0.14 0.00 0.16
LTGDISP 0.23 0.27 0.96 0.09 -0.07 0.11
Panel B
Cross-Sectional Correlation Coefficients: N = 84





UMD 0.1662 -0.2108 -0.0136
(0.1308) (0.0543) (0.9023)
DISP 0.1120 0.3574 0.1159 -0.3546
(0.3103) (0.0008) (0.2938) (0.0009)
LTGDISP 0.2495 0.5052 -0.3511 -0.2263 0.4913
(0.0221) (0.0001) (0.0011) (0.0385) (0.0001)
55
Table 3: Regressions of Excess Returns on Explanatory Factors
This table provides time-series regression coefficients of excess returns on explanatory factors for a value-weighted port-
folio of the S&P 500 firms from January 1991 to December 1997 (N = 84). The explanatory factors include the excess
market factor, the size factor, the book-to-market factor, the momentum factor, the short-term dispersion factor and the
long-term dispersion factor. The general form of the model follows from equations (19) and (20). t-statistics in paren-
theses and adjusted-R2s are reported for each model. Model 1 is a one-factor model that uses the excess return on the
value-weighted market index, which corresponds to the standard CAPM. Model 2 supplements the excess market return
with size and book-to-market factors (Fama and French 1993). Model 3 represents the Carhart (1997) four-factor model,
which includes the market, size, and book-to-market factors, plus a factor which captures momentum. Models 4 and 5 ex-
amine the excess market return in conjunction with the short-term and long-term dispersion factors, respectively. Models
6 and 8 combine the three-factor model with short-term and long-term dispersion, while Models 7 and 9 augment Models
6 and 8 with the momentum factor.
Model Intercept rm − rb SMB HML UMD DISP LTGDISP Adj-R2
1 0.06 1.03 0.9516
(0.73) (40.42)
2 -0.07 1.08 0.10 0.14 0.9614
(-0.88) (42.04) (3.71) (4.06)
3 0.01 1.10 0.08 0.14 -0.13 0.9701
(0.14) (47.98) (3.10) (4.60) (-4.94)
4 0.15 1.02 0.26 0.9639
(1.99) (45.92) (5.39)
5 0.06 1.01 0.12 0.9570
(0.74) (40.68) (3.36)
6 0.04 1.05 0.06 0.10 0.19 0.9667
(0.45) (42.63) (1.90) (2.83) (3.69)
7 0.06 1.08 0.05 0.11 -0.10 0.12 0.9718
(0.86) (45.83) (1.94) (3.54) (-3.92) (2.37)
8 -0.08 1.06 0.06 0.15 0.13 0.9659
(-1.07) (43.20) (1.90) (4.73) (3.39)
9 -0.01 1.08 0.05 0.15 -0.11 0.09 0.9725
(-0.09) (48.07) (1.69) (5.12) (-4.47) (2.79)
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Table 4: Performance of Variance Forecasting Models for Individual Firms
This table displays forecasts of monthly return variances (in %) generated from 15 models based on a rolling 60-month
window of data for each stock. Reported are the Pearson correlation coefficients, the slope coefficient in the regression
of realizations on forecasts and the adjusted-R2 values for those regressions. Model 1 contains the market factor. Model
2 is the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, while Model 3 is the three-factor model plus the momentum factor.
Model 4 (5) is computed from the market factor plus short-term (long-term) dispersion. Model 6 (8) expands on 4 (5) by
adding size and book-to-market factors, while Model 7 (9) expands on 6 (8) with the inclusion of the momentum factor.
Model 10 (11) isolates the impact of the short-term (long-term) dispersion factor. Models 12, 13, 14, and 15 exclude the
impact of the market factor from models 6, 7, 8, and 9, respectively.
Model Correlation Slope Adj-R2
1 0.5403 0.66 0.2990
2 0.4203 0.63 0.2267
3 0.5339 0.59 0.2851
4 0.5404 0.66 0.2987
5 0.5388 0.66 0.2968
6 0.4170 0.60 0.2208
7 0.5367 0.61 0.2880
8 0.4172 0.59 0.2236
9 0.5337 0.61 0.2848
10 0.5457 0.68 0.3051
11 0.4874 0.66 0.3033
12 0.5358 0.65 0.2927
13 0.5358 0.62 0.2870
14 0.5332 0.63 0.2898
15 0.5347 0.61 0.2859
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Table 5: Comparison of actuals, forecasts and recommendations, (April 1994- December 1997)
This table provides summary statistics for the actual gross returns, the average forecasted gross returns, and the analyst
recommendations for the portfolios used in our GMM estimations. The first return used is from April to May of 1994
and last return used is from November to December of 1997. All returns are adjusted for inflation with the CPI. At each
date, the average forecasted return is computed by weighting the forecasts of each investment house by their importance.
The means reported in the table are the means over all dates in our sample. The recommendations were computed as
follows. A single analyst recommendation of a single stock is assigned a -2 if the analyst strongly recommends selling
the stock, -1 if the analyst recommends selling the stock, 0 if the analyst recommends holding the stock, 1 if the analyst
recommends buying the stock, and 2 if the analyst strongly recommends buying the stock. Recommendations for the
portfolios are constructed by taking a weighted average across analysts (where the weights are the importance of the
analysts) and a weighted average across the stocks in the portfolio (where the weights are determined by the market share
of the stocks. The market recommendations reported are only for the subset of stocks for which we have data — the
returns forecasts and the actual returns are for a larger group of stocks. We also don’t have any data on the return forecasts
or the recommendations of the nominal risk-free bond used in our estimations.
Comparison of actual returns, return forecasts, and recommendations
Actual returns Return forecasts Recommendations
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Market 1.0198 0.0333 1.0205 0.0062 0.8118∗ 0.0052∗
High volatility portfolio 1.0178 0.0454 1.0039 0.0095 0.9055 0.0876
High short-term dispersion portfolio 1.0002 0.0391 0.9895 0.0222 0.7473 0.0690
High long-term dispersion portfolio 1.0194 0.0397 1.0031 0.0093 0.8596 0.0909
Nominal Risk-free bond 1.0040 0.0004 — — — —
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Table 6: Estimates of the consumption-based model
This table displays GMM estimates ofθ, β, and γ in the consumption-based model with five assets – the market, a
nominal risk-free bond, and three portfolios. The portfolios consist of stocks with a high degree of past volatility, a high
degree of long term dispersion, and a high degree of short term dispersion. The standard errors of the parameters are
listed under the variables in parenthesis. If there is no standard error present then the variable was fixed and not estimated.
In this case the value of the variable in the estimate column is the value at which it is fixed. Objective is the value of the
GMM criterion. In panelA we fix φ at one and in panelB we fix φ at 0.05.
Panel A:φ = 1 Panel B:φ = 0.05
Model θ β γ Objective θ β γ Objective
1 88.70 0.999 1 0.5206 476.05 0.999 1 0.5412
(35.98) (250.85)
2 40.70 0.999 5 0.5188 180.88 0.999 5 0.5326
(14.21) (87.27)
3 28.91 0.999 10 0.5068 125.85 0.999 10 0.5234
(9.77) (54.99)
4 0 1.005 5 0.6038 0 1.005 5 0.6038
(0.030) (0.030)
5 0 0.999 447.07 0.3698 0 0.999 447.07 0.3698
(235.41) (235.41)
6 0 0.966 457.29 0.3692 0 0.966 457.29 0.3692
(0.3831) (318.57) (0.3831) (318.57)
7 1 1.005 5 0.6036 1 1.005 5 0.6038
(0.030) (0.030)
8 1 0.999 445.20 0.3626 1 0.999 447.10 0.3694
(235.51) (235.41)
9 1 0.953 459.70 0.3618 1 0.966 457.31 0.3690
(0.3956) (321.30) (0.3832) (318.60)
10 40.63 1.003 5 0.5096 179.89 1.009 5 0.5326
(14.32) (0.004) (88.48) (0.005)
11 3.68 0.999 229.87 0.3188 18.93 0.999 439.54 0.3110
(2.01) (229.87) (9.88) (238.51)
12 -4.60 0.688 497.00 0.2932 19.01 0.956 453.64 0.3104
(1.97) (0.530) (414.47) (9.54) (0.414) (343.07)
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Table 7: Estimates of the consumption-based model with biases
This table displays GMM estimates ofd, θ, β, andγ in the consumption-based model with biases. The assets are the
market, a nominal risk-free bond, and three portfolios. The portfolios consist of stocks with a high degree of past volatility,
a high degree of long term dispersion, and a high degree of short term dispersion. The standard errors of the parameters are
listed under the variables in parenthesis. If there is no standard error present then the variable was fixed and not estimated.
In this case the value of the variable in the estimate column is the value at which it is fixed. Objective is the value of the
GMM criterion. In models one through four,φ is fixed at one andζ is fixed at 0.8118. In models five and six,φ is fixed at
0.05 andζ is fixed at 0.8118. In models seven through ten,φ is fixed at one andζ is fixed at 0.9. In models 11 and 12,φ
is fixed at 0.05 andζ is fixed at 0.9.
Model d θ β γ Objective
1 0.040 0 0.999 5 0.5312
(0.031)
2 0.048 43.90 1.003 5 0.4038
(0.076) (13.77) (0.006)
3 0.048 0 0.879 498.59 0.2501
(0.037) (0.478) (354.02)
4 0.047 -4.51 0.674 509.04 0.1849
(0.196) (0.3084) (0.549) (362.96)
5 0.059 243.60 0.991 5 0.4014
(0.031) (55.60) (0.034)
6 0.044 17.91 0.928 473.54 0.2120
(0.787) (36.66) (0.782) (537.54)
7 0.068 0 0.999 5 0.4210
(0.034)
8 0.058 26.68 1.004 5 0.4070
(0.277) (38.46) (0.011)
9 0.051 0 0.981 443.11 0.2282
(0.037) (0.400) (328.51)
10 0.047 2.45 0.922 447.65 0.2256
(0.167) (0.42) (0.440) (333.60)
11 0.060 114.85 1.005 5 0.4109
(0.085) (101.06) (0.022)
12 0.053 0.00 0.993 442.18 0.2282
(0.163) (7.44) (0.393) (329.06)
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